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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vernon Zipprich appeais from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Zipprich pied guilty to one count of forgery of a financial transaction card. 
(R., p.49.) In August of 2008, the court sentenced Zipprich to a unified eight-
years with the first two years fixed and placed Zipprich on probation for five 
years. (Id.) Zipprich did not appeal his judgment of conviction or sentence. 
Zipprich violated his probation and his original sentence was imposed in October 
of 2009. (Id.) Zipprich was granted Rule 35 relief and did not appeal the 
imposition of his sentence. (Id.) 
On April 8, 2013, Zipprich filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
pp.3-14.) Zipprich claimed his piea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered 
because of insufficient information provided by his attorney regarding his 
immigration status; his attorney was ineffective for failing to adequately advise 
him of possible immigration consequences from his guilty plea; and although not 
timely filed, the time for filing his petition for post-conviction relief should have 
been tolled. (See generally. R., pp.3-14.) The state filed a boilerplate answer 
including a request that Zipprich's claims be "denied and/or dismissed." (R., 
pp.21-24.) The district court thereafter filed a notice of intent to dismiss 
Zipprich's petition for post-conviction relief and an amended notice of intent to 
dismiss, giving Zipprich 30 days to respond with admissible evidence to cure 
1 
evidentiary deficiencies in his petition. (R., pp.49-56, 71-77.) The state filed a 
notice with the court asserting it would "reserve fiiing" a motion for summary 
dismissal "pending the outcome" of the court's notice of intent because "the 
grounds the State would assert would be exactly the same and therefore such 
pleading is unnecessary at this time." (R., p.78.) Zipprich filed a response to the 
court's intent of notice to dismiss as well as affidavits prepared by himself and his 
father and exhibits regarding Zipprich's deportation status. (R., pp.80-107.) 
The court entered an order dismissing Zipprich's petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.108-121.) Zipprich timely appealed from the final 
judgment dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.125-133.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Given the length of the issues listed in Zipprich's opening brief, they are 
not reprinted here. 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Zipprich failed to establish that the district court erred in summariiy 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Zi prich Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Dismissing His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
Zipprich challenges the district court's summary dismissal of his post-
conviction petition. Specifically, Zipprich asserts the district court erred in 
determining he was not entitled to equitable tolling of the time limit for filing his 
petition for post-conviction relief where the only reason he pied guilty to the 
underlying charge was because his attorney misinformed him of the possible 
consequences of a guilty piea on his immigration status. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.18-25.) Zipp rich has failed to establish a valid basis for the equitable toiling of 
the time in which to file his petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, 
Zipprich claims multiple procedural errors in the court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-18.) The record, 
however, reveals that the district court complied with the post-conviction notice 
requirements of I.C. § 19-4906 in dismissing Zipprich's petition. As such, 
Zipprich has failed to show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001 ). 
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C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction reiief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding in which the peti~ioner bears the burden of establishing that he is 
entitled to re!ief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983); Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 
1999). Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application 
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221; 
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct App. 1995). 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), a district court may sua sponte dismiss a 
post-conviction application when the court is satisfied that the applicant is not 
entitled to relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221. In such 
instances, the court must give the petitioner notice of the reasons for its 
contemplated dismissal, and an opportunity, within 20 days, to respond. LC. § 
19-4906(b); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 
(1995); Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221. The purpose of the 20-
day notice requirement of !.C. § 19-4906(b) is to ensure that the applicant will 
have an opportunity to chailenge an adverse decision before it becomes final. 
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 158, 715 P.2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1986); 
Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 759, 653 P.2d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 1982). 
However, if a district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction 
application relying in part on the same grounds presented by the state in its 
5 
motion for summary dismissal, the notice requirement has been met. Buss v. 
State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Workman v. 
State, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007). See also Saykhamchone, 
127 Idaho at 322, 900 P2d at 798 (A district court need not provide the applicant 
with notice of the court's dismissal if it is in response to a sufficiently specific 
motion from the state.)). 
D. Zipprich Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief After Finding It 
Untimely And \Nithout A Basis For Tolling 
Zipprich argues on appeal he was entitled to equitable tolling to allow the 
filing of his untimely petition for post-conviction relief because his attorney 
misinformed him of the possible consequences to his immigration status if he 
pied guilty, thus making his guilty plea unknowingly and unintelligently entered. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-25.) The district court summarily dismissed Zipprich's 
petition for post-conviction relief on three separate bases: Zipprich's petition for 
post-conviction relief was untimely and without a basis for tolling; Zipprich is not 
entitled to retroactive application of Padilla 1; and Zipprich's misunderstanding of 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea did not render his plea involuntary. 
(R., pp.108-121.) 
The district court's well-reasoned decision, attached as Appendix A, is 
incorporated to this Respondent's Brief and relied upon as if fully set forth herein. 
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2009) (establishing a standard requiring 
defense counsel to advise a defendant about the possible risk of deportation as a 
result of a guilty plea). 
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(Appendix A.) Zipprich has failed to show ariy error by the district court In 
determining that his petition iacked legal merit 
E. The District Court's Dismissal of Zit:'.prich's Petition Was Was Properly 
Fntered Following The Court's Notice Of Intent To Dismiss 
On appeal, Zipprich outlines six separate ways he contends he was 
deprived of due process in the district court's sua sponte summary dismissal of 
his petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-18.) Zipprich 
contends, among other things, that the district court was required to provide him 
additional opportunity to respond to the state's request for dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief instead of acting upon its own notice of intent to 
dismiss. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) He also asserts, unsupported by 
authority, that the court was not permitted to make an uitimate decision before 
allowing him, through his attorney, to "develop and present evidence." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6, 13.) Additionally, Zipprich objects to the court's taking 
judicial notice of previous court hearings without allowing for his response. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6, 16-18.) Because Zipprich has failed to demonstrate that 
the district court failed to follow the procedure for summary dismissal of a post-
conviction petition, his argument fails. 
Summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief is proper 
when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact, 
which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221; Martinez v. 
State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). It was Zipprich's 
burden to show he was entitled to relief. Bearshield, 104 Idaho at 678, 662 P.2d 
7 
at 550: Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221 (the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), 
a district court may sua sponte dismiss a post-conviction application when the 
court is satisfied that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 
863, 979 P.2d at 1221. In such instances, the court must give the petitioner 
notice of the reasons for its contemplated dismissal, and an opportunity, within 
20 days, to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 
321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995); Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221. 
Zipprich was given that opportunity and failed to meet his burden. 
The court filed a notice of intent to dismiss and gave Zipprich 30 days to 
respond with admissible evidence. (R., p.76.) Zipprich asserts a series of 
procedures he believes the court improperly engaged in, or failed to engage in. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-27.) Review of the record, however, shows that the 
court complied fully with the procedural requirements of I.C. § 19-4906, and 
properly dismissed on timeliness grounds and for failure to state a legally 
cognizable claim. 
Zipprich has failed to show that the district court's decision to dismiss his 
petition for post-conviction relief was made in violation of the procedural 
requirements of I.C. § 19-4906. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Zipprich's petition for post-conviction relief. 
8 
DATED this 10th day of February 2014. 
I I \ ' 
"0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of February 2014, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BR!EF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
RANDOLPH B. NEAL 
482 Constitution Way Suite 22i .
1 Idaho Falls, ID 8340 \ 
\ 
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APPENDIX A 
L E D 
___ .., ,.M. ___ P.M. 
JUL O 1 2013 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S HILL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DiSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
VERNON ZIPPRICH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV13-3460 
ORDER DISMISSING UNIFORM POST-
CONVICTION PETITION 
In Canyon County case CR-2007-4126, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count 
of forgery of a financial transaction card. At the time he entered his guilty plea, the 
Court provided him with a Statement of Rights Regarding Immigration Status. The 
Court entered a Judgment of Conviction, sentenced the Petitioner to eight (8) years, 
with two (2) years fixed, and placed the Petitioner on probation for five (5) years, with 
Judgment and Commitment entered August 7, 2008. No appeal was filed. 
Thereafter, an allegation of probation violation was filed. The Petitioner was 
arrested and the he Court ultimately determined that the Petitioner had violated the 
terms and conditions of his probation, and revoked probation and executed the 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION - Page -1 
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previously imposed sentence. The Court granted the Petitioner's Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 motion by Order on October 20, 2009. Again, no appeal was taken. The Petitioner 
was released from the Idaho Department of Correction on October 19, 2011. 
Thereafter, in March, 2013, the Petitioner was taken into custody by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agents and now faces deportation proceedings. 
On April 8, 2013, Petitioner filed this Petition pursuant to the Uniform Post-
Conviction Petition Act,. In this verified petition, the Petitioner claims that: 
.1) His guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made because despite receiving 
the notification regarding immigration consequences, this was insufficient to inform 
him of the clear immigration consequences of his plea; 
2) His attorney was ineffective because his attorney failed to adequately advise him 
regarding the possible immigration consequences following his guilty plea, pursuant 
to Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1382 (2010), citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
a) The failure to advise the Petitioner of clear immigration consequences fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness, as simple research would have 
revealed that a conviction for any law relating to a forgery is a deportable 
offense; 
b) Petitioner has been prejudiced because had he known of the immigration 
consequences, he would have gone to trial or attempted to negotiate a plea 
agreement to an offense that would not have similar immigration consequences; 
3) Although he acknowledges the petition was not filed within the statutory time frame, 
Petitioner asserts there should be a tolling of the time limit until Petitioner discovered 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION - Page -2 
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the issue, which was in approximately January, 2013, when peti~ioner was arrested 
by immigration officials and fac;ng deportation proceedings. He asserts that the 
failure to receive advice about the immigration consequences implicates an 
important due process right for which the time to file his petition should be tolled. 
At the time the petition was filed, there were no accompanying affidavits to 
the Petition nor are there any portions of the record to support the claims. The State 
filed an Answer, asserting that the Petition fails to state any ground upon which relief 
can be granted, the claims should have been raised on direct appeal, there is 
insufficient factual support for the petition, and the petition is untlmely. 
Thereafter, the Court issued a Proposed Notice of Intent to Dismiss and 
gave the Petitioner 30 days to respond to the issues addressed therein. The 
Petitioner filed two affidavits and a response. The Petitioner indicated that it would 
include a copy of the Sentencing transcript when it was prepared. The Court then 
reviewed the audiotapes of the Change of Plea and Sentencing hearings, of which it 
takes judicial notice by Order filed contemporaneously with this Order. 
Contents of the Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4903 provides: 
The application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was 
convicted, give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence 
complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the 
application is based, and clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the 
personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from 
other allegations of facts and shall be verified as provided in section 19-
4902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shali 
be attached to the application ru .the application shall recite why they are 
not attached. The application shall identify all previous proceedings, 
together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the applicant to 
secure reiief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and 
discussion of authorities are unnecessary. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION - Page -3 
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The Petitioner has not provided admissible evidence to establish that eqLlitable 
tolling should apply based either on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel or on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, inte!ligent!y and 
voluntarily entered. 
Timeliness 
A Post-conviction petition must be flied "within one (1) year from the expiration of 
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a 
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). In this case, the 
Judgment of Conviction was entered on August 7, 2008, thus, the Petitioner had until 
September 18, 2009 to file his petition unless he can establish some reason to toll that 
time period. Although Petitioner argues that the time to file the petition should be tolled 
because he didn't realize he could be deported until ICE began immigration 
proceedings, his petition is time barred "unless he can show such an inability to file a 
timely petition that he was denied any meaningful opportunity to present his post-
conviction claims." Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791, 794 (Ct. App. 
2011.) Tolling is not allowed for a petitioner's own inaction. Id. The failure to file a 
timely petition in this case is a½tributable solely to the Petitioner's lack of diligence, not 
because Petitioner was "unable to timery file a petition due to extraordinary 
circumstances beyond his effective control, or the facts underlying the claim were 
hidden from the petitioner by unlavvful state action." Id. 
The Petitioner has made no allegations, nor supported with admissible evidence, 
any claim that he was somehow prevented from filing a petition or that there was 
unlawful state action, instead, the Petitioner alleges that because his attorney failed to 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION - Page -4 
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acivise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, he has estab!:shed an 
important due process violation for which the time to file the petition shouid be tolled. 
At ieast as to his Sixth Amendment right, Petitioner has not established an 
important due process violation that justifies tolling the time to file the petition on that 
ground. The United States Supreme Court held in Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 
1103 (2013), that the standard established in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 
S.Ct. 1473 (2009), requiring defense counsel to advise defendant about the risk of 
deportation as a result of a guilty plea did not apply retroactively to cases already final 
on direct appeal. 
Because Petitioner's case arose in 2008, before the Padilla requirement and 
because Padilla does not apply retroactively, his attorney did not render deficient 
performance by failing to independently advise Petitioner of the immigration 
consequences of entering a plea. Generai!y speaking, it is not required that a 
defendant be informed of collateral or indirect consequences that arise as a result of a 
· guilty plea. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99-101, 982 P.2d 931, 934-36 (1999). Prior to 
Padilla, then, there was no Sixth Amendment requirement that defense attorneys advise 
or discuss immigration consequences with the Petitioner because immigration 
consequences were conside,ed a collateral consequence. Thus, contrary to Petitioner's 
argument that, in essence, Padilla did not establish a new rule, and therefore, some 
standard regarding this advice should apply, the United States Supreme COL1rt directly 
rejected that argument in Chaidez. 
There, the Court specifically found that Padilla announced a new rule, i.e., the 
result of Padilla, "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 
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conviction became final." Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107, 185 L. Ed. 
2d 149 (2013). The question presented in Padilla addressed whether advice about 
deportation was "categorically removed" from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel because it invoived only a collateral consequence of a conviction, rather than a 
component of the criminal sentence. Id. at 1108, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149. Because that issue 
was unsettled, and because 'Padilla 's holding that the failure to advise about a non-
criminal consequence could violate the Sixth Amendment would not have been-in fact, 
was not-"apparent to all reasonable jurists" prior to our decision," the Court held that 
Padilla announced a new rule. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1111, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013). 
Because Padilla is not applied retroactively, prior to 2009, there simply was no 
Sixth Amendment requirement that defense counsel advise the Petitioner of the 
potential immigration consequences that might arise following a guilty p!ea. 1' Chaidez, 
133 S.Ct. 1103. Because there was no Sixth Amendment requirement that trial counsel 
advise the Petitioner, there is no deficient performance on the part of trial counsel for 
failing to discuss immigration consequences, Strickland v. Vvashington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), and that cannot establish a basis for tolling the time in this case. 
The Petitioner Has Not Established His Guilty Plea Not lntel!iaently And Knowinglv 
Entered 
Additionally, the Petitioner has not established that there is an equitable ground 
to toll the time for filing the petition as it relates to the guilty plea, as the Petitioner was 
1 Moreover, that is not the factual scenario we have here, as defense counsel explicitly 
stated at the sentencing hearing that the Petitioner could be deported as a 
consequence of his guilty plea in this case. 
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on notice that at the time he entered his plea and it was reiterated at the time cf 
sentencing, that he could face immigration consequences of the result of his plea. 
Because the Petitioner has not articulated or established any evidence that he was 
prevented from timely filing the present case, he has not estabiished equitable grounds 
for tolling the time for filing the petition. 
This Court is cognizant of the holding in Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 
904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007), that where the post-conviction claim raises important 
due process issues, the limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has 
discovered the factual basis for the claim. Id. (emphasis added.) However, the factual 
basis for the claim in this petition - whether the Petitioner was adequateiy advised of his 
potential immigration consequences - arose at the time of the Change of Plea hearing 
and/or the Sentencing hearing and as such, there is no reason proffered by the 
Petitioner that he could not raise his c!aim timely. V\/hether or not the Petitioner is 
subsequently deported is irrelevant to a determination of whether he was given 
adequate information at the time his plea was entered such that his guilty plea was 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11, the Petitioner was advised by way of written 
notification that entering his guilty plea could have immigration consequences. At that 
time, Petitioner had notice and was aware of the fact that he could face deportatio:1 or 
removal. The time he discovered the claim v.;as not, as argued by Petitioner, at the time 
he actually faced deportation proceedings, but rather, at the time he did or did not 
receive notice that he could face such proceedings. 
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it is beyond cavil that a guiity piea must be knowingly, intell!gent!y and vol'..mtari!y 
entered to comply with due process requirements. "The idaho Supreme Court has held 
that a prima facie showing of compliance with due process requirements is made when 
the minimum requirements of !.C.R. 11 have been met." State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 
859, 172 P.3d 1133, 1134 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Compliance with these standards turns upon whether: (1) the plea was 
voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the nature of the 
charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses, 
and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant understood the 
consequences of pleading guilty. 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002) (internal 
citations omitted.) 
A guilty plea is an inteliigent guilty plea when the, "criminal defendant first 
receives 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him,"' which includes "being 
informed of the critical elements of the charged offense." State v. Salazar-Garcia, 145 
Idaho 690, 692, 183 P.3d 778, 780 (Ct. App. 2008). There is no allegation that the 
Petitioner was not informed of the critical elements of the charged offense, and it 
appears he was informed of the nature of the offense, the possible penalties and certain 
collateral consequences. (Audio, Change of Plea hearing). 
There is no information that the guilty plea was involuntary, i.e., that "an innocent 
person would have felt compelled to plead guilty in like circumstances." Mata v. State, 
124 Idaho 588, 594, 861. P.2d 1253., 1259 (Ct. App. 1993) There is no allegation, nor 
any admissible evidence in the affidavits, that the Petitioner suffered any coercion or 
pressure to enter his plea or to accept the plea offer that had been tendered. As such, 
the Petitioner has not established that the guilty plea was involuntary. 
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A knowing plea is one where the Defendant understands the nature of the 
consequences which the court may impose. State v. Heredia, :44 ldaho 95, 98, 156 
P.3d 1 :93, 1196 (2007). There is no allegation that the Petitioner was not informed of 
the minimum and maximum sentence, the direct consequences, as wel! as the collateral 
consequence of deportation or removal. In fact, at the Change of Plea heari:lg, the 
district court explained the potential for immigration consequences and at the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and the defense attorney indicated that deportation 
was a possible consequence, the Petitioner's father indicated he was uncertain whether 
the imposition of sentence would result in deportation and the district court again 
instructed the Petitioner that the convic:ion could have immigration consequences. 
The Petitioner alleges that he was "misinformed" concerning his plea. 
Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that in an immigration hearing in a different state in a 
different proceeding that occurred before he entered his plea in this case, the 
Immigration judge cancelled the deportation proceedings. Based on that, the Petitioner 
believed that the relief granted in the Immigration proceedings app!led to the pending 
criminal case. (Affidavit of Vernon Zipprich). 
However, after the immigration proceedings, and prior to accepting the 
Petitioner's guilty plea in this case, the district court advised the Petitioner of the general 
immigration consequences that could result as a consequence of the guilty plea; the 
Petitioner did not say at that point that he did not believe the immigration consequences 
would appfy to him or indicate that he did not understand how the immigration 
consequences could apply to him given the previous immigration proceedings. In short, 
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the Petitioner said nothing to anyone that would indicate he did not belief or understand 
the potential immigration consequences that could arise as a result of his guilty plea. 
The Petitioner claims his guilty plea was based on "misinformation" and cites 
several cases for the proposition that if a defendant is given incorrect information, that 
misinformation may render the guilty plea constitutionaiiy infirm. However, those cases 
are inapplicable to the facts at bar because in all the cases cited by Petitioner, there 
was an affirmative misrepresentation as to a critical element or a direct consequence of 
the offense either by the Court (Salazar-Garcia, a critical element of the offense - the 
value of the property taken - was affirmatively misrepresented to the defendant by the 
magistrate court, Id. at 693, 183 P.3d at 781; State v. Weyrich, 163 Wash.2d 554, 557, 
182 P.3d 965, 966 (2008), the court affirmatively misrepresented the maximum 
sentence (a direct consequence) that could be imposed; State v. Mendoza, 157 Wash. 
2d 582, 141 P.3d 49 (2006), the court affirmatively misrepresented a direct 
consequence of the guilty plea, which was a miscalculated offender score) or the 
defense attorney (State v. Garcia, 320 N.J. Super. 332, 727 A2d 97 (N.J. Super. Ct 
App. Div. 1999), Petitioner could establish his attorney affirmatively misrepresented the 
immigration consequences - Le., that the Petitioner would not be deported.) 
In this case there is no such affirmative misrepresentation; in fact, based on the 
Record, there are no misrepresentations of any kind by any state actor in Idaho 
because every state actor in Idaho told the Petitioner he could face deportation as a 
result of his conviction. Additionally, the Petitioner has not provided any statements that 
are an incorrect statement of the law or misinformation regarding his plea or its 
consequences. On the contrary, in the Record before this court, the information the 
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Petitioner was given by the Court, the prosecutor and the defense counsel was correct 
- he could face deportation as a result of his conviction. Thus, there was no 
misinformation given in this case. 
The Petitioner alternatively argues that that because he erroneously believed he 
would not be deported because a prior deportation hearing relating to the underiying 
criminal case was cancelled before he entered his gui!ty plea in the criminal case, that 
false belief invalidates his guilty plea. The Petitioner's "false belief" that he would not 
face deportation is not synonymous with misinformation such that his guilty plea was 
invalid. The Petitioner's false belief was based on his own interpretation of a Court 
Order from a different judge in a different state on a different proceeding, not on 
anything his trial attorney, the prosecutor or the district court in Idaho said or did. 
In this case, prior to accepting the guilty plea, the district court informed the 
Petitioner that entering his plea could adversely affect his ability to remain in the country 
because of deportation, his ability to return to the county, and becoming a citizen. 
(Change of Plea audio). At that time, the Petitioner did not voice any information about 
his beliefs regarding deportation or that he believed he would not suffer any immigration 
consequences as a result of his guilty plea. Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, the 
defense attorney specifica!ly asked the Petitioner's father at sentencing, "One of the 
poss(b!e effects of the sentence in this case is that Vernon could be deported back to 
South Africa, you know that for a fact, right?" and then asked Mr. Zipprich, Sr., b 
explain to the court the difficulties the Petitioner would face if deported. fvlr. Zipprich, 
Sr., then explained to the district court judge how difficult the economy was in South 
Africa and how difficult it would be for the Petitioner to find work in South Africa and that 
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he would have no family, support system or resources in South Africa should Petitioner 
be deported. 
Petitioner's father further testified at sentencing about his understanding 
regarding the deportation hearing that occurred and stated the immigration judge said 
the "Petitioner would not be deported and would be given another chance and that 
shouid he for any reason be arrested again, the deportation would be final and would 
iead to deportation."2 Defense counsel then asked if the arrest would have to be in 
another case or in the current case and Mr. Zipprich, Sr. stated he believed the arrest 
needed to be 1n another case. He further stated that he did not know what the 
consequences of a prison sentence would be on the deportation proceedings. 
(Sentencing Hearing audio). 
Both defense counsel and the Court made it clear to the Petitioner that he could 
be deported as a result of his guilty plea and conviction in this case; the fact that the 
Petitioner chose to disregard that information does not mean his guilty plea was not 
knowingly, inteiligently and voluntarily entered. Moreover, because he was on notice of 
the factual basis of his claim at the time he entered his plea, he has not established any 
valid basis to withdraw his guilty plea and has further not established any equitable 
2Assuming that Mr. Zipprich, Sr., is correct in his recitation of statements made by the 
immigration judge, the immigration judge said that any subsequent arrest would lead to 
deportation. This is consistent with what occurred procedurally, as it appears that 
deportation proceedings were not initiated until the Petitioner was subsequently 
arrested on a Probation Violation Allegation, resulting in the revocation of his probation 
and execution of the previously-imposed sentence. Thus, it is unclear whether the 
Petitioner could have avoided the deportation he now complains of by complying with 
the terms and conditions of probation and not having a subsequent arrest and 
revocation of probation. 
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basis to toll the time for fiiing the petition based on the ciaim that the guilty plea was not 
knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily entered. 
Therefore, because there was no requirement that defense counsel advise him of 
the immigration consequences of his plea and because he was so advised and had 
notice of the claim at the time the Judgment of Conviction was enteied, the Petitioner 
has not established any important due process claims relating to the performance of 
counsel or the entry of his plea that would justify the toiling of the time for filing the 
petition in this case. Without any equitable tolling, Petitioner acknowledges that his 
;:ietrtion is untimely and the Court HEREBY DISMISSES THE PETITION on the grounds 
that it was untirneiy filed and the Petitioner has not established an equitable basis to toli 
the time for filing the petition. 
Dated this 1b£_ day of June, 2013. 
Molly J. Husk~y (J 
District Judge 
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CERT1FiCATE OF SERVICE 
er~ 
The undersigned certifies that on the ) day of~ 2'613, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING UNIFORM POST-
PETiTION on the following individuais in the manner described: 
@ upon counsel for petitioner: 
Randolph Neal 
482 Constitution Way, Suite 222 
Idaho Fa!ls, ID 83402 
"" upon counsel for Respondent: 
Gregory Swanson 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell ID 83605 
• upon Petitioner: 
Vernon Zipprich 
Immigration and Custom Enforcement and Removal Operations 
Utah County Jail 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. fAaii with 
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
B~~~~-. -
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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